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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 




H.E. THOMAS, INTERNATIONAL 
EQUITIES, INC., NATIONAL 
FUND, INC., and AMERICAN 
SAVINGS & LOAN ASSOCIATION, 
Defendants - Appellants, 
WALTER WALLIS and MARLENE 
WALLIS, 
Plaintiffs - Respondents, 
vs 
H.E. THOMAS, INTERNATIONAL 
EQUITIES, INC., NATIONAL 
FUND, INC., AMERICAN SAVINGS 
& LOAN ASSOCIATION, and GLEN 
JUSTICE MORTGAGE COMPANY, INC. 
Defendants - Appellants, 
Case No. 17051 
APPELLANTS' BRIEF 
EXPI.ANATION-OF REFERENCE-TO RECORD 
Plaintiffs commenced two almost identical lawsuits 
(#233143 & 239555) which were then consolidated (R. A85-93; 
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R. B 54, 73). In numbering the record the clerk commenced 
with page #1 in each of the case files. To avoid confusion 
References (R.) to the file in case #233143 will be followed 
by the letter "A" and to the file in case 11233555 will be 
followed by the letter "B" to distinguish between the two 
files. (For example see reference above). Reference to 
the trial transcript are shown as "R" only. 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
Judgment for alleged violation of Utah Uniform Land 
Sales Practices Act ("UTAH ACT") 57-11-1, UCA, 1953, err-
oniously held that "disposition" of four parcels from a 300 
acre tract constituted the "disposition" of an "unregistered" 
and "unexempt" "subdivision under the Utah Act. A copy of 
the Utah Act is furnished as appendix "I" for the convenience 
of the Court. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The case was first tried by Judge Leary who dismissed 
plaintiffs' claim Under the Utah Act, their claim for res-
cission and awarded judgment for alleged fraud (R. B 83, R. 
88-90). Judge Leary then vacated that judgment and offered 
a new trial after determining that he had committed reversable 
error (R. A 177, 184). After a second trial Judge Taylor 
dismissed the fraud claim without prejudice [but with pre-
judice if there was no appeal] (R. A 253), dismissed the 
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rescision claim with prejudice and awarded judgment under 
the Utah Act (R. A 234). 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
An order holding that said 10 acres are not "subdivided 
lands" within the meaning of the Utah Act; and/or that the 
10 acres are "exempt" from the Utah Act and reversing plain-
tiffs' judgment under the Utah Act; or that failing, for 
a new trial on plaintiffs' claim under the Utah Act; also 
holding that dismissal of the fraud claim was with prejudice 
and in res judicata. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The statement of facts has been grouped under major 
headings as follows: 
1. Alleged misrepresentations are not important to 
decision -
Whether or not misrepresentations or omissions were made 
concerning the 10 acres in Iron County exchanged to plaintiffs 
is unimportant since defendants acknowledge that the Iron County 
land was not registered as a subdivision (57-11-5, UCA, 1953) 
and that no public offering statement was given to plaintiffs 
(57-11-5 thru 57-11-10, UCA, 1953) and that under the Utah Act 
either of those facts would be sufficient to support plaintiffs 
judgment (57-11-17, UCA, 1953) if their 10 acres are "un-
exempt" (57-11-4, UCA, 1953) "subdivided" lands (57-11-2, 
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UCA, 1953) within the meaning of the Utah Act, accordingly, 
alleged misrepresentations are not important to the div-
ision herein. 
2. The primary controlling issue in this case is whether 
the 10 acres exchanged to plaintiffs was part of a "subdivision" 
within the meaning of the Utah Act. 
If the 10 acres was not part of a "subdivision" within the 
meaning of the Utah Act, (see discus si.cn on pages ------
beiow) or if exemptior.s in the act aprlied (see discussion on 
pages ______ below) then the~ 1 ower couri: P.rred and the judg-
ment should he reversed. It is unnecessary to discuss plaintiffs' 
claim that defendant.s misrepresented the 10 acres. However, so 
that the Court mc:Ly more fully understand the controlling iss-
ues a brief summary of plaintiffs' allegions as to misrepresentatior 
by defendants (which are all disputed) is furnished as a part 
of the statement of facts. 
3. Plaintiffs accepted the 10 acres in exchange for their 
equity in a home that was about to be lost thru foreclosure -
Plaintiffs house was about to be sold at sheriff's sale 
by the second trust deed holder because plaintiffs were about 
six months in default in making payments on both first and 
second trust deeds. (R. 557, 558, 560, 561, 590, 596, 688, 
708). Plaintiffs' efforts to sell their house had been un-
successful (R. 558, 590, 591) and plaintiffs believed that 
- 4 -
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a sheriffs sale of their house was scheduled two weeks 
(R. 560-561). Plaintiffs answered a newspaper advertisement 
of defendant International Equities, Inc. ("IEI") offering 
to purchase homes (R. 558,). Plaintiffs and IEI entered 
into handwritten exchange agreement (Ex. 14-P-see appendix II) 
whereby IEI exchanged an unidentified said 10 acres in Iron 
County (R. 707) for plaintiffs' home equity (R. 565, 566, 691). 
That agreement was formalized by later typewritten agreement 
containing some minor modifications (R. 569, 570, Ex. 2-P 
and 30-D appendix III). Plaintiffs deeded their house to 
:1: IEI (Ex. 3-P, appendix IV) in exchange IEI deeded the 10 acres 
to plaintiffs (Ex. 9-P-appendix V), plaintiff's were trying to 
salvage their credit rating to avoid a possible deficiency 
it judgment, and lose of other security for the loan, plaintiffs 
attached little value to the land and felt that whatever they 
got was better than a foreclosure (R. 708). 
4. Plaintiffs made no investigation concerning or ex-
amination of their 10 acres -
Plaintiff's were so unconcerned about the 10 acres that 
they didn't even look at a map (R. 606) to locate the general 
area where the property was located before signing the ex-
change agreement (appendix II) or before deeding their house 
to IEI (appendix IV). Plaintiffs did not inspect or visit 
the 10 acres (R. 721) or make independent inquiry about the 
property, its location, value, proximity to roads, utilities, 
surrounding property, etc. (R. 607-616, 708-710), except to Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
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call an aunt who worked for the state Road Commission and 
who made some general inquiry of other Road Commission em-
ployees. (R. 572, 573). 
Plaintiffs did not determine whether the 10 acres was 
in the valley or mountains (R. 703, 609), the direction 
from Cedar City (R. 609), whether the 10 acres was west or 
east of the freeway (R. 710, 615), or make inquiry of realtors 
or others concerning the value of land in that area (R. 618). 
Plaintiffs' gross inattention and negligence in exercising 
care to protect their own interests are classic examples of 
unjustified alleged reliance which the Utah Supreme Court has 
said precludes recovery in fraud actions. See Oberg v. Sanders, 
111 U. 507, 184 P.2d 229; Jardine v. Brunswick, 18 U. 2d 378, 
423 P.2d 659; Lewis v. White, 2 U. 2d 101, 269 P.2d 865; 
Adamson v. Brockbank, 112 U. 52, 185 P.2d 264. Plaintiffs' 
unreasonable conduct, among other things, justifies dismissal 
by the Court of plaintiffs' claims (R. A-253). 
5. Plaintiffs' unreasonably claim that they thought that 
the 10 acres in Iron County was equal in value, type and quality 
to the Bell Canyon Subdivision in Southeast Salt Lake County 
(R. 723-727, 626-633). 
Plaintiffs claim at the trial that they believed they 
were getting improved lots in a subdivision complete with 
roads, white rail fences and nearby utilities in an area with 
growing crops which was allegedly near to Brian Head Ski Resort 
(R. 698, 725,566). Plaintiffs deed (appendix V) descrihed 
- t:. -
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their 10 acres by metes and bounds plaintiffs located 
the property generally on a map within a few days after 
the exchange (R. 567-568, 571-572, 611, 615, 625-627, 694), 
yet plaintiffs lived in the home which they had traded to 
IEI for over a month after the exchange, then voluntarily 
moved without complaint (R. 618). They did not express 
dissatisfaction with their bargain for approximately six months. 
6. IEI determined that plaintiffs had little or no equity 
in the home and exchanged the 10 acres for whatever that equity 
might be - (R. 790). 
The IEI appraised plaintiffs' house and determined that 
they had little if any equity over and above the first and 
second mortgages (R. 769, 786 -789, 796, 802 - 805) and offered 
to give them the 10 acres for whatever plaintiffs' equity in 
their home might be (R. 790 - appendix III). Thomas denies 
that misrepresentations were made concerning the 10 acres in 
Iron County. 
7. IEI made three other casual conveyances from the 
300 acres in 7 years, two of which were tranfered to re-
lated corporations -
During January, 1975, (approximately 6 months preceding 
the exchange with plaintiffs) IEI exchanged 5 acres from the 
300 acre tract for some office furniture (Ex. 7-P, R.673, 
680); in April, 1975, (after IEI had losed its offices see 
page #16 below) IEI transfered 5 acres (without consideration) 
to a related corporation (R. 673, 678- 680 - Ex. 6-P) and 
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transferred some oil and gas rights (again without con-
sideration) to another related corporation (R. 681, 679. -
Ex. 8-P). No other transactions involving said 300 acre 
tract occurred thru the time of trial (R. 661), which was 
approximately 5 years after transaction with plaintiffs and 
7 years after !EI bought the 300 acres. No parcels were 
advertised, offered for sale or sold to the public from that 
300 acre tract (R. 686). !EI has never subdivided property 
or sold subdivision lots (R. 687). 
As indicated above the only portions of the 300 acre 
tract disposed of by !EI since its 1973 purchase were the 5 
acres exchanged for office furniture, 10 acres exchanged for 
plaintiffs' house equity and a 5 acre parcel and some oil and 
gas rights transferred to related corporations (R. 686). 
8. !EI was not required to register under the Utah Act. 
Since those transactions were not within the scope of the 
Utah Act, and since !EI was not in and did not intend to en-
gage in the business of subdividing selling or offering to 
sell property to the public they were not required to and 
did not register, furnished a public offering statement or 
otherwise comply with the Utah Act, 57-11-1, UCA, 1953, et 
seq. (R. 675-676). 
ARGUMENT 
Point I 
THE 10 ACRES in IRON COUNTY is NOT A "SUBDIVISION" OR 
"SUBDIVIDED LANDS" WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE UTAH ACT AND 
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WAS AN EXEMPT TRANSACTION. 
9. SCOPE AND PURPOSE OF UTAH ACT-
This action is based upon the Utah Uniform Land Sales 
Practices Act ("UTAH ACT"). The Utah Act requires a sub-
division to file with a copy of the Utah Act is attached as 
Appendix "I". (57-11-5 thru 57-11-10, UCA, 1953,) and to ob-
tain the approval of the Department of Budiness Regulation of 
a registration, public offering statement and to furnish other 
information before "disposition" may be made of subdivided lands." 
The Utah Act prohibits disposition of or offers to dispose of 
"subdivided lands" in Utah until after the subdivided lands 
are registered under the act (57-11-5(1), UCA, 1953), and 
unless an effective (and comprehensive - 57-11-6 and 57-11 
-7, UCA, 1953) current public offering statement is delivered 
to the purchaser and a receipt for that offering statement 
is obtained from him not less than 48 hours before he enters 
into a contract dor the purchase of subdivided lands (57-11-
5(2) and (3), UCA, 1953). The statute allows injunctive re-
lief for threatened violations (57-11-11, UCA, 1953) imposes 
severe criminal penalties (57-11-16, UCA, 1953) and give liberal 
civil remedies to the buyer of noncomplying "subdivided lands," 
including the right to rescind his contract within 48 hours 
after signing if the required offering statement is delivered 
to him less than 48 hours before he signed (57-11-5(2), UCA, 
1953), the right to recover the consideration paid with in-
terest and attorney fees upon tender of reconveyance if the 
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seller fails to register the subdivision, fails to deliver 
a current approved oublic offering statement, makes an untrue 
statement of a material fact, omits to state a material fact 
required to be included in the registeration statement or 
in the offering statement or omits to state a material fact 
which is necessary to make the statements made not misleading 
(57-11-17, UCA, 1953). The Utah Statute specifically refers 
(57-11-2(9), 57-11-16(1), UCA, 1953, and elsewhere therein), to 
a similar Federal Statute (Federal interstate Land Sales Full 
Disclosure Act (15 U.S.C. §1701, et seq] and require un-
iformity of construction with decisions of other states which 
have enacted similar uniform laws (57-11-21, UCA, 1953). The 
Utah Statute is a part of a national movement to regulate the 
promotion and sale of subdivided land by speculatrs. The 
Utah Act not intended to regulate the sale of undeveloped land 
which has not been and is not then intended to be "subdivided". 
10. Utah Act exempts subdivisions with less than 10 
units, isolated transaction, dispositions of oil and gas in-
terests, property acquired by builders, offers which are not 
for gain or profit, etc. 
The Federal statute as it then existed exempted subdivi-
sions containing less than fifty (50) lots (15 U.S.C.S. §1701 
(3) and §1702 (a)(l) [exemption has since been changed to 
twenty-five (25) lots]. The Utah Statute defines a "sub-
division" as excluding property which has been or is proposed 
- 10 -
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to be divided into less than 10 lots (57-11-2(6), UCA, 
1953). Other exemptions are included in the Utah Statute 
for single or isolated transactions (57-ll-4(l)(a), UCA, 
1953), for property containing certain building or where 
seller has a contractural obligation to construct a building 
within two years (57-ll-4(l)(b), UCA, 1953), where the pro-
perty is acquired for use in the business of constructing 
residential, commercial or industrial building (57-11-4(1) 
(c), UCA, 1953), where the transaction involves dispositions 
of an interest in oil, gas or minerals if those transactions 
are regulated as securities (57-ll-4(2)(e), UCA 1953), offers 
which are not for gain or profit (57-11-2(2), UCA, 1953, and 
contains certain other exemptions. 
11. Plaintiffs failed to sustain burden of proving 10 
acres were "subdivision" land-
Before plaintiffs can recover under the Utah Uniform 
Land Sales Practices Act, 57-11-1, UCA, 1953, et seq., they 
must establish that the transaction wherein they acquired 
the 10 acres of raw ground in Iron County was a transaction 
covered by the Utah Act. If that land was not a "subdivision" 
or "Subdivided Lands" as defined by 57-11-2(6), UCA, 1953, then 
the statute is simply not applicable and the judgment of 
Judge Taylor should be vacated and set aside. 
12. Construction by Federal Court of similar statute 
limits imposition of liability to those who meet definitions 
under statute -
~· ~2~thampton National Bank, (CA 3rd, 1978) 
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584 F2d 1288 the U.S. Court of Appeals considered a claim 
under the Interstate Land Sales Act, 15 U.S.C.S. §1701 (4) 
(a similar federal statute) against a bank that had finance 
contracts for subdivision lots. It was claimed that the bank 
was an "indirect seller" or "developer" within the meaning of 
§1703 the act (lSUSES §1703). Similar provisions concerning 
indirect control of a subdivider as found in the Utah Act, 57-
11-17 (c)(e), UCA, 1953. 
The Court quoted with approval from the U.S. Supreme Court 
case of Ernst v. Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 197 96 S. 
Ct. 1375, 47 L. Ed. 2d 668 (1976) and Blue Chip Stamps v. 
Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 756, 95 S. Ct. 1917, 44 L. 
Ed 2d 539, decision (at Page 1293) as follows: 
"Initially ... the starting point in every case 
involving construction of a statute is the language 
itself" ... "The Act clearly limits the imposition 
of liability to those who meet the definitions of 
developers or agents of developers. Developers are 
those who directly or indirectly engage in selling 
efforts. Thus, since the Act provides for liability 
for misstatements or omissions in the statutorily 
required Statement of Record and Property Report or 
in statements made to offeres of lots in a subdivision 
logically the statute should be interpreted to include 
within its scope only those engaged in the selling effort 
In Pa uin v. Four Seasons of Tennessee, Inc. 517 F. 2d 1105 
5th Cir. 1975), t e court stated. We think that the 
language of [§1709 of the Act] indicates that Congress 
intended the developer to be liable for its own acts and 
those of its agents, which is the usual rule, but it did 
not mean to scoop up every guide or salesman ... and 
make them a unless the , too, have the authorit """"tO 
sell and to do emphasis added 
The Court then went on to reason that the bank was not 
an indirect seller within the meaning of the act, as follows: 
" ... the reference to 'indirect sellers' in the 
Act as defining who may be considere~ developers, 
can only be constituted as encompassing those who 
conduct their sellin efforts throu h means other 
t an irect, act-to- ace contac7s wit uyers, as, for 
example, through agents. There i~ ""''"' ~ ..... ...l.:_:_~.._.: -~ ~ 
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the language or in the legislative history of the 
Act that an indirect seller is other than one who is 
involved in some manner in the selling efforts related 
to a land development project." (emphasis added). 
13. Legislature did not mean to "scoop up" sellers of 
unsubdivided lands-
In a like manner we must look to the language of the 
Utah Act and avoid a construction which would "scoop up" all 
persons who sell unimproved land which has not been "sub-
divided" and who at the time of the transaction, do not "pro-
pose" to "subdivide" their land within the meaning of the 
Utah Act. The statute was intended to prohibit and punish 
fraud in land subdivision development enterprises involving 
a substantial number of lots [limited under the Utah Act to 
at least la lots] and should be flexibly construed to effect 
its remedial purposes. See Nargiz v. Henlopen Developers, 380 
A. 2d 1361 (Delaware) at P. 1364, and Mccown v. Heidler (10th 
Cir. 1975) 527 F. 2d 204. The Utah Statute (57-11-2(6) UCA, 
1953) defines a "subdivision" and"subdivided lands" for the 
purpose of that act as: 
land which is"divided" or is "proposed to be divided 
for the prupose of disposition into ten or more units" 
are offered as part of a common promotional plan of 
advertising and sale." (emphasis added). [see app-
endix I] 
14. Plaintiffs' 10 acres is not part of a "subdivision" 
or "proposed subdivision" so Utah Act does not apply. 
It is undisputed that the land was not "subdivided" 
(P.675-676). There is no evidence in the record which would 
tend to support a claim that defendants have at any time offered 
"~,.... ...... "',.. T"nn,.-o nnir~"- for sale, or that any of the parcels were Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
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conveyed ... as part of a connnon promotional plan of 
advertising and sale within the meaning of (57-11-2(6), 
UCA, 1953) since there is no evidence in the record 
from which the Court could conclude that defendants 
"proposed to ... divide" their land "for the purpose of 
distribution into ten or more units," plaintiffs' 10 acres 
are simply not part of a "subdividison" within the statutory 
definitions (57-11-2(6)), UCA, 1953), the statute is in-
applicable and the judgment should be vacated. 
15. Record contains no evidence of intent or "proposal" 
to "subdivide"-
Counsel for plaintiff argued at the trial (R. 852-853) 
that said four conveyances of land from the 300 acre that 
over a period of seven months was evidence that defendants 
"proposed" to "divide" said land into ten or more parcels for 
"purposes of disposition." It is difficult to understand 
how the four unrelated dispositions proves that IEI intended 
to convey additional parcels. That argument illustrates 
the weakness of plaintiffs' case and the absence of any 
evidence to support a claim that defendants were "subdividers" 
within the meaning of 57-11-2(5), UCA, 1953, or that defendant's 
land is a "subdivision" within the meaning of 57-11-2(6), UCA, 
1953. There was no evidence of any "connnon promotional plan" 
involved in those conveyances, each being different in type 
and kind, with only two having been made to other than related 
corporations (R. 673, 678-681), to-wit: the conveyance to 
plaintiffs and the conveyance to a f··---= '""··-- _____ , ~ -
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exchange for furniture (R. 673,680). The conveyance to 
related corporations (R. 673, 678-681, Ex 6-P & 8-P) were 
not "dispositions" for "gain or profit" as required by 57-
11-2 (l), UCA, 1953, since they were made without consideration 
(R. 679-680), and are expressly excluded from the scope of 
the Utah Act. There was no evidence of defendant advertising 
the property for sale (R 686). There is no evidence in the 
record which would tend to indicate that at the time of their 
exchange of the 10 acres to plaintiffs the defendants in-
tended to dispose of any additional parcels of property 
from the 300 acre tract. To the contrary, the undisputed 
evidence shows that defendants intended to hold and have held 
the property for investment (R. 683). 
16. Abandoned prior investigation into possibility of 
subdividing does not convert investment land into a "sub-
division" or "proposed subdivision"-
When defendant purchased the property in 1973 it in-
vestigated the feasibility of subdividing the property and 
selling recreational lots with dirt roads and without ut-
ilities (R. 781, 782, 820). IEI then had an employee who 
had prior experience with another employee in subdividing 
and selling such property (R. 781-782) who in connection with 
his feasibility investigation employed an engineer who drew 
a preliminary subdivision plat (R. 683, 782-782, 806) and 
for an attorney to investigate possible registeration of the 
property under the Utah and/or Federal Acts (R. 781-782). Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
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About February, 1974, after that preliminary investigation, 
IEI determined that there was too much red tape involved 
(R. 686, 782), that the timing was not right (R. 790) and 
abandoned the project, cancelled the office lease, closed 
the business office, sold the furniture, (R. 686) discharged 
the employees (including the employee with experience in sub-
dividing) discontinued that proposed business, move the re-
maining typewriter and desk to Mr. Thomas' home, and decided 
to hold the land for investment purposes (R. 781-783). 
From the date of purchase in 1973 until abandoment of the 
project in February, 1974, it might have been agreed that the 
300 acres "land which is ... proposed to be divided for the 
purpose of disposition into ten or more units" within the 
meaning of 57-11-2(6), UCA, 1953. Had the sale to plaintiffs 
occurred during that period it might have been a sale within 
the scope of the act. However the undisputed evidence showed 
that the investigation of the possibility of subdividing was 
abandoned before it reached the status of a proposed offering 
and long before it reached the state of actually subdividing, 
selling lots or offering lots for sale the term "proposed" 
refers to existing proposals or plans and not to past abandoned 
plans or projects. Once investigation of a potential project 
subdividing the 300 acre tract was abandoned (in February, 1974) 
it was no longer a "proposed" subdivision (assuming but not 
agreeing that it would qualify as a "proposed subdivision" 
during that period ) but was simply an investment. The dis-
- 16 -
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position of small parcels in a casual manner from land held 
as an investment is not regulated by either the Federal or 
Utah Acts. Once investigation concerning the possible sub-
division project was abandoned it was no more a "proposed" 
project than had no such subdividing investigation ever been 
made. 
17. Meaning of "proposed to be divided" -
As indicated above, it is undisputed that IEI did not 
"subdivide" its property. Unless it "proposed" to "divide" 
its land within the meaning of 57-11-2(6), UCA, 1953, the 10 
acres is not a "subdivision" within the meaning of 57-11-2(6), 
UCA, 1953, and the statute does not apply to plaintiffs. Black's 
Law Dictionary, Revised Fourth Edition and cases there cited 
define "Propose" as "an offer; something proffered," and as 
"signification by one person to another of his willingness to 
enter into a contract on the terms specified in the offer." By 
adding the letters "ed" to propose we convert it into the past 
tense "proposed" which signifies that a specific determination 
has in fact been made to (sub)divide the land. The balance of 
the phrase "for the purpose of disposition into ten or more 
units" further qualifies the meaning to require a continuation 
of a prior decision (there had been no such decision) to divide 
the property into 10 or more units for the purpose of disposition. 
Accordingly, if there had been a decision to subdivide for pur-
poses of disposition into 10 or more units (which there was not) 
once those plans are abandoned there is no longer a "proposed" 
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18. Other exemptions available to IEI -
Even if the 10 acres had been part of an actual or 
proposed subdivision (which it was not as demonstrated above), 
still plaintiffs would not be entitled to recover against def-
endants because of specific exemptions in the statute, including 
the following: 
(a) The two conveyances to related corporations were 
not "for gain or profit" within the meaning of the exemption 
from the Utah Acted in 57-11-2(2), UCA, 1953, (R. 686). 
(b) The transaction with plaintiffs was a "single or isolated 
transaction" for the plaintiffs "own account" within the 
meaning of the exemption from the Utah Act in 57-ll-4(l)(a), 
UCA, 1953. 
(c) Plaintiffs testified that they acquired the property 
for purposes of constructing homes as a business (R. 625, 841, 
which is a transaction which is specifically exempt from the 
Utah Act as provided in 57-ll-4(l)(c), UCA, 1953. 
(d) The disposition of oil and gas interests (Ex. 8-P, 
R. 681) [to a related corporation as mentioned above] is ex-
empt from the Utah Act as provided in 57-ll-4(e), UCA, 1953. 
Exempt transactions cannot be used to prove violation of or 
intent to violate the Utah Act since the "division" or "proposal 
to divide" would necessarily require subdividing in non-exempt 
transactions. 
POINT II 
THE COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING THE FRAUD CLAIMS "WITHOUT 
PREJUDICE" IN THE EVENT THAT DEFENDANTS APPEALED. 
- 1 A -
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al 
After trial where plaintiffs' fraud claims were fully 
litigated the Court first dismissed the fraud count (second 
claim for relief - RA 7-9) without prejudice (R. A 222, 
234) and later amended the judgment of dismissal to provide 
(R. A 254, ,5) as follows: 
" ... Plaintiffs' Second Cause of Action is hereby 
dismissed with prejudice if no appeal is taken from 
this judgment, and dismissed without prejudice if an 
appeal is taken from this judgment." 
In Matthews v. Matthews, 102 U. 428, 132 P.2d 111 The Court 
stated the reason for the res judicata rule as follows: 
The foundation principle upon which the doctrine of 
"res judicata" rests is that parties ought not to be 
ermitted to liti ate the same issue more than once, 
an , that when a right or fact has been ju icial y 
determined by a court of competent jurisdiction, or an 
opportunity for such trial has been given, the judgment 
of the court, so long as it remains unreversed, should 
be conclusive upon the parties and those in privity 
with them. (emphasis added) 
To dismiss a claim "without prejudice" after a trial 
flies in the teeth of the principal of res judicata and is 
beyond the power of the Court. Either plaintiffs proved their 
case or they did not. If it is to be dismissed the dismissal 
must be with prejudice. To attempt to prevent defendants from 
taking an appeal by this type of conditional judgment is con-
trary to the letter and spirit of Art. VIII, §9 of the Utah 
Constitution which gives a right of appeal to the Supreme 
Court from all final judgments of the District Court. Under 
the judgment as rendered it would not become final until the 
time for appeal had expired. The judgment of the District 
Court should be amended to provide that the dismissal of the 
second cause of action (fraud count) is with prejudice. 
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CONCLUSION 
The 300 acre tract owned by IEI was not "subdivided" nor 
"proposed to be divided for the purpose of disposition into 
ten or more units" [only 4 parcels were conveyed] and the 10 
acres acquired by plaintiffs was not "offered as a part of a 
common promotional plan of advertising and sale" within the 
meaning of 57-11-2(6), UCA, 1953, and accordingly was not 
"subdivided lands" which was covered by the Utah Act. Had 
IEI's land been covered by the act (which it was not) the 
transaction involved in this lawsuit would have been exempt as 
an "isolated transaction", since two of the three other con-
veyances were transferd to related corporations which were 
"not for gain or profit" within the meaning of 57-11-2(2), 
UCA, 1953, and one of those conveyances was of gas and oil 
rights which was also exempt under 57-ll-4(2)(e), UCA, 1953. 
The only other transaction was an unrelated exchange of 5 acres 
for furniture which was remote in time. 
The Utah Act simply does not apply under the facts which 
required that the judgment be vacated and set aside. 
The Court's attempt to dismiss the second claim "without 
prejudice" after trial is in error. The Court should correct 
- 20 -
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the dismissal to state that it was with prejudice. 
DATED this 28th day of August, 1980. 
Respectfully submitted. 
/?fUgLf.~~ ~ LD • B R 
Attorney for Defendants-Appellants 
2870 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84115 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that I caused to be delivered a copy of the 
foregoing to Wayne G. Petty, Attorney for Respondants - Plain-
tiffs, 600 Deseret Plaza, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111, this 28th 
day of August, 1980. 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
